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The Argentine: from economic growth to economic retardation 
(1850s - 1980s)
A review of the economic and social history literature
Colin M. Lewis
The debate about a failure to sustain growth and the process of relative (or 
absolute) decline is of more than academic interest. For much of the period addressed 
by this paper, Argentinian have been aware of the international economic ‘ranking’ of 
their country. Drawing positive comparisons between national and US growth trajec- 
tories around the end of the nineteenth Century, several commentators argued that the 
future was bright while some political leaders predicted a Continental leadership role for 
the country. Immigrants from Italy and Spain, who arrived in large numbers in the 1880s 
and the 1900s, testified to the fact that material conditions were then massively better 
in the republic than in Europe. By the 1920s per capita incomes were high by European 
and Latin American Standards and gaining relative to salaries and wages in other areas 
of recent settlement like Australia. Düring the inter-war decades, the Argentine was 
easily the most prosperous economy in South America - accounting for around half 
Continental output and overseas trade - and by far the most industrialised. This position 
was maintained for much of the second quarter of the twentieth Century. Latter, by the 
1960s, negative contrasts were being made with the course and pace of development in 
neighbouring republics and other economies. Argentinians were even less confident 
about their prosperity and international position by the 1980s.
This paper examines the historical growth record and surveys the historiography in 
search of an explanation for the apparent inability to effect a smooth transition from 
rapid growth and institutional change at the end of the nineteenjth Century to a deve- 
loped polity and economy during the second half of the twentieth. The paper begins by 
displaying output and income data for the last one hundred years or so and then schools 
the literature and reviews principal contributions to an analysis of the ‘Argentinian 
economic involution’.
The historic growth record
Recent calculations by Roberto Cortds Conde and Angus Maddison broadly 
corroborate earlier research by Carlos F. Di'az Alejandro. Dfaz Alejandro argued that 
the economic performance of the republic around the tum  of the Century set an interna­
tional record.1 Few countries can match the Argentinian experience from the 1870s to 
the eve of the First World War in terms of high rates of growth sustained over a 
relatively long period. Initially lacking reliable statistical data for GDP, Dfaz Alejandro 
was content to make this assertion on the basis of information about overseas trade, 
frontier movement (the extension of land under cultivation), immigration and population 
growth, and public overhead Capital investment represented by the railway system. The 
international record set during these decades probably stood until the late twentieth 
Century when it was broken by rapidly industrialising East Asian countries like Taiwan 
and South Korea.2
Table I
The Argentine: annual average rates of growth
a)
Aggregate Output
b)
GDP per capita
1875-1896 3.7% 1870-1890 1.9%
1896-1912 2.3% 1890-1913 2.2%
1912-1928 -0.1% 1913-1950 0.7%
1928-1948 2.3% 1950-1973 2.1%
1948-1961 0.3% 1973-1989 -2.2%
1961-1976 2.3%
1976-1987 -1.8%
Source: (a) R. Cortes Conde ‘El crecimiento econömico de la Argentina en el largo plazo’ 
unpublished paper presented at Carlos III University, Madrid, 26-27 May, 1994.
(b) A. Maddison ‘Long-run Economic Growth in the European Periphery’ unpu­
blished paper presented at the European Historical Economics Society Workshop, 
La Coruna, 1993. [For slightly different published data, see ‘A Comparison of Levels 
of GDP Per Capita in Developed and Developing Countries, 1700-1980’, Journal o f 
Economic History, 43:1 (1983) Table 1.]
1 C.F. Dfaz Alejandro, Essays on the Economic History o f the Argentine Republic, (New 
Haven, 1970) pp.2-3. .
2 R. Summers and A  Heston, ‘The Penn World Table (Mark5): an expanded set of inter­
national comparisons, 1950-1988’, Quarterley Journal o f Economics 106:2 (1991) 327-368. 
Summers and Heston (Table III, pp. 357-8) estimate GDP growth at 9.3% (1960-73), 
6.9% (1973-1980) and 8.3% (1980-88) for South Korea and 10.5%, 8.4% and 6.7% for 
Taiwan: Dfaz Alejandro (Essays, p.3) guesses that aggregate Argentinian GDP grew at a 
rate of at least 5% p.a. for the 50 years before 1914. .
Table I displays the magnitude of the Argentinian achievement. Until the First World 
War the economy grew rapidly. Indeed, rates of growth of output during this period 
established not only an international record but set a domestic benchmark that is only 
now being equalled. This feat is all the more remarkable given that population expanded 
rapidly. High rates of growth per capita were sustained notwithstanding the fact that 
total population doubled between 1869 and 1895, the dates of the first and second 
national censuses, and again between 1895 and 1914 when the third census was taken. 
Between 1869 and 1914, annual rates of population increase averaged 3.4 percent.3 Net 
inter-continental inunigration accounted for approximately half the growth in population 
during the period and was most intense in the 1880s and the years immediately before 
1914.
The above table also suggests that the First World War had an adverse impact on 
the economy. Aggregate output growth was negative between 1912 and 1928, notwith­
standing a fairly strong recovery in the mid 1920s, the average being depressed by a 
sharp economic contraction in 1914 followed by further falls in 1916 and 1917. As in 
many open economies, the foreign trade sector was thrown into chaos in 1914 by the 
closure of European financial markets, the disruption of international shipping services 
and the decline in world commerce. Sources of long-term Capital dried up and access to 
commercial credit was denied as northern hemisphere banks sought to strengthen 
domestic balance sheets by calling in loans.4
Exogenous shock was rapidly transmitted to the domestic economy through a 
decline in purchasing power and fiscal contraction. Argentinian govemments had long 
financed a significant part of current expenditure as well as investment by borrowing 
overseas. However, as in the early 1930s, some sectors began to pick-up fairly quickly. 
In the last quarter of 1917, recovery seemed to become more generalised. The collapse 
in exports production bottomed while the terms of trade improved considerably, aided 
by Allied purchases of basic Commodities. Recession retumed with the end of the post­
War re-stocking boom but by late 1925 most production indices were again moving up 
and the domestic and extemal positions strengthened later in the decade. This recovery 
heightened the impact of the crash in 1929. Yet by 1933 domestic output began to 
recover and by 1935 had already exceeded the level of 1929.5 Cortes Conde estimates 
that the GDP index, which stood at 405.3 in 1929 (1900=100), contracted to 370.7 in 
1930 and 363.9 in 1931 before bottoming out in 1932 at 346.5. There was a slight 
recovery in 1933 but production surged in 1934 and again in 1935 by which time the
3 Di'az Alejandro, Essays p.3.
4 B. Albert, South America and the First World War: the impact o f the war on Brazil, 
Argentina, Peru and Chile, (Cambridge, 1988), p.37, 38.
5 G. Di Telia and M. Zymelman, Las etapas del desarrollo econömico argentino, (Buenos 
Aires, 1967), appendices B and C.
index stood at 428.4.6 The strength of recovery was quite remarkable, not least in view 
of a 14 percent decline in aggregate output between 1929 and 1932 and the fact the 
export earnings had plummeted by 34 percent in 1930.
As Cortös Conde shows, the overall record for the second quarter of the twentieth 
Century was not too dissimilar to that of the immediate pre-First War years. Again the 
per capita growth figure was lower due to continuing high rates of population growth: 
population doubling once more between the third national census and the fourth, taken 
in 1947. Although substantially down on the pre-1914 period, immigration remained 
strong for much of the inter-war decades and the rate of natural increase was lifted by 
the pre-war immigration bulge. Between 1913 and 1929 the annual average rate of 
population increase was 2.8 percent and from 1929 to 1939 1.8 percent compared with 
3.5 percent between 1890 and 1913.7 Thereafter, rates of demographic growth feil away 
dramatically. Lower population growth undoubtedly contributed to the relatively positive 
perform ance of the economy during classic period of im port-substituting 
industrialisation. This is implied by the close proximation of aggregate date provided by 
Cortes Conde for the period 1961-76 and the per capita statistics of Maddison for 1950­
1973.
Maddison and Cortes Conde also concur that overall economic performance in the 
twentieth Century has been marred by sluggish or negative growth in two distinct 
periods: (i) the First World War and immediate post-war years and (ii) the late 1970s 
and 1980s. The latter dates are virtually coterminous with the years of military rule and 
the debt crisis. As indicated below, it was also during these two periods that the position 
of the Argentine exhibited most slippage relative to comparable economies. Growth 
rates were faltering before the military seized power in 1976 and the proceso argentina 
was explicitly presented as a project to restructure economy and society. Rejecting the 
post-Second World War Consensus in favour of import-substituting industrialisation, the 
armed forces and civilian technocrats argued that sustainable growth would be achieved 
by the application of neo-liberal shock therapy and renewed opening to the world 
economy.8
6 R. Cortes Conde, ‘Estimaciones del producto bruto interno de Argentina, 1875-1935’, 
Universidad de San Andres, Economi'a, Docomentos de Trabajo No. 3, Buenos Aires, 
1994, p.17.
7 AM. Taylor, ‘Three Phases of Argentine Economic Growth’, National Bureau of Econo­
mic Research Working Paper, Cambridge, Mass., 1994, pp.5-7, 24 (Table 2).
8 L.A Sjaastad, ‘Argentine Economic Policy, 1976-81’ in R. Dornbusch and G. Di Telia 
(eds.), The Political Economy o f Argentina, 1946-83 (London, 1989) pp.254-5; D. Azpiazü 
and B. Kosacoff, ‘Exports and Industrialization in Argentina, 1973-86’, CEPAL Review 36 
(1988) 62.
As stated above, the First World War and its aftermath and the half decades either 
side of 1980 were years when the relative economic performance of the Argentine began 
to diverge from that of other countries listed in the data sets.
Table II
Comparative Economic Performance:
Annual Average Rates of Growth of GDP per capita
I Arg Brazil Mexico Aus Canada UK USA
19001913 2.5 1.4 1.8 1.1 3.3 0.7 2.0
1913-1950 0.7 2.0 1.0 0.7 1.5 0.8 1.6
1900-1950 1.2 1.8 1.2 0.8 2.0 0.8 1.7
1950-1973 2.1 3.8 3.1 2.5 2.9 2.5 2.2
1973-1987 -0.8 22 0.9 1.5 2.2 15 \5  -
1950-1987 1.0 3.2 2.3 2.1 2.0 2.2 1.9
1900-1987 1.1 2.4 1.6 1.4 2.3 1.4 1.8
Source: A. Maddison The World Economy in the Twenüeth Century (Paris, OECD, 1989) pp.
15, 35.
Comparative statistics collated by Maddison confirm that at the beginning of the twen- 
tieth Century the Argentine was one of the fastest growing economies in the Table II 
group. Although somewhat out-performed by Canada from 1900 to 1913, Argentinian 
annual average rates of growth per capita were higher than those for the USA, for other 
Latin American republics and for Australia, economies with which it is conventionally 
compared. The following period saw the country slip from the top of the table to the 
bottom, indicating that of the countries listed, the Argentine was most adversely affected 
by war and depression. While the growth record was substantially better from 1950 to 
1973, the republic was out-performed by every other country. It was during this period 
that the ‘growth gap’ with Latin American economies widened against the Argentine. 
Having grown substantially more rapidly than Brazil and Mexico in the half-century 
before the First World War, the country now lagged considerably behind those econo­
mies. Between 1973 and 1987, the Argentine is the only country in the set to register 
negative growth. Given the impressive rate of economic growth achieved around the 
tum  of the Century, some slippage was inevitable. The critical question is why, unlike 
Canada which grew particularly rapidly immediately before the First World War, the 
Argentine was unable to maintain median rates of growth thereafter.
Similar evidence of divergence and deceleration is provided by per capita output 
estimates compiled by Dfaz Alejandro (Table III). His data for the Argentine, Australia 
and Brazil closely parallel trends described by the calculations of Maddison.
Table III
Gross Domestic Product per capita
(a)
(US$ at 1970 prices)
The Argentine Australia Brazil
1880 470 1520 139
1901 780 1360 190
1913 1030 1690 230
1928 1200 1590 340
1939 1170 1670 430
1945 1280 1940 470
1955 1380 2340 670
1970 1960 3470 1100
1973 2049 3723 1459
1980 2184 4022 1924
Source: Carlos F. Dfaz Alejandro ‘No less than One Hundred Years of Argentine Economic 
History plus some Comparisons’ in A  Velasco Trade, Development and the World 
Economy (Oxford 1986) p. 233.
(b)
(US$ 1965 at factor cost)
Argentine Brazil Mexico Spain UK USA
1870 420 101 110 _ 668 567
1913 804 169 143 444 1025 1344
1950 1013 309 282 401 1439 2384
1965 1301 479 427 976 2046 3229
1980 1632 1113 643 1608 2544 4295
Source: A  Maddison, ‘A Comparison of the Levels of GDP per capita in Developed and 
Developing Countries, 1700-1980’ Journal o f Economic History, 43:1 (1983) 27-4Z
Despite different starting points, Dfaz Alejandro shows how the republic began to ‘catch- 
up’ with Australia between the 1880s and 1920s. Subsequently, the gap widened as 
Australian GDP surged ahead. The contrast with Brazil is also remarkable. Between 
1955 and 1980, Brazilian GDP per capita virtually tripled while the Argentinian figure 
grew by barely one half. The story told by Maddison’s larger set is similar.
To retum  to the earlier data of Cortes Conde and Maddison (Table I). Notwith- 
standing a periodisation based on different turning points, they offer a fairly similar 
chronology of long-run development. Their approaches point to long swings rather than 
sharply schematised stages suggested by Di Telia and Zymelman.9 The increasing 
availability of refined quantitative and qualitative data for post-1870 decades provides 
reasonably solid evidence to support the argument that the half-centuiy before 1912-14 
was the most dynamic epoch in recent Argentinian economic history. Major international 
events such at the two World Wars and the 1929 crash had a major impact though are 
not universally accepted a significant watersheds. Nevertheless, the inter-war years were 
obviously a period of adjustment and, possibly, restructuring. Thereafter, long-run rates 
of growth were far from unimpressive, at lest until the 1970s. Veiy recent calculations 
by Cortes Conde support two additional interpretations. First, they indicating three 
distinct phases in modern Argentinian economic history. From the mid 1870s until 1912 
there was a strong growth trend. Despite sluggish performance in the mid 1870s and 
around the tum  of the Century and a downtum in the early 1890s, GDP per capita 
registered a sharp up-swing. In the inter-war decades there was a plateau: there were 
two sharp cycles but little overall trend. Immediate pre-First World War level of output 
per capita were not recaptured until the late 1930s. Thereafter another strong up-swing 
occurred, lasting until the mid 1970s. Second, the data also shows that after each major 
down-tum, recovery took longer. Following the first Baring Crisis of 1889, GDP per 
capita had already registered a strong recovery in 1892. With the shock of the First 
World War, the downturn which started in 1913 ended in 1916. Similarly, following the 
pre-inter-war depression peak of 1928, the low point was 1932. The downturn which 
began in 1947 ended in 1952 but the down-swing that started at the end of the 1970s did 
not bottom out until virtually a decade later.10 This again raises the issue of divergence. 
Not why the Argentine diverged substantially from average international performance 
during the phase when the country was growing particularly rapidly around the turn of 
the Century, but why it failed to sustain rates approaching the international mean 
thereafter.
9 Di Telia and Zymelman, Las etapas, pp.22-32.
10 Cortes Conde, ‘Estimaciones’, p.17 and ‘The Growth of the Argentine economy in the 
long-run, 1875-1988’ unpublished paper presented at the London School of Economic and 
Political Science, November, 1995.
What the periodisation adopted in Table I disguises is increasing economic volatili- 
ty during the second half of the twentieth Century, particularly in the early 1960s, the 
latter part of the 1970s and in the 1980s. Annualized indices register only one year of 
negative growth between 1900 and 1913. In the turbulent period from 1914 to 1946, 
inclusive, the economy failed to grow on only eight occasions. In the 1950s and 1960s 
there were two years of negative growth each decade: in the 1970s three and in the 
1980s five, including 1988 when the level of economic activity contracted by about a 
quarter.11 These were also years of ratcheting inflation, culminating in bouts of hyper­
inflation between 1988 and 1990. Around the middle of the twentieth Century, economic 
cycles shortened. Three-to-five year cycles displaced the previous pattem of approxima- 
tely eight year swings.12 Di Telia and Dornbusch chart the increasing volatility of the 
economy and accompanying political decomposition in terms of regime change. Between 
the inauguration of the first administration of Juan D. Perön in 1946 and that of Alfon- 
sfn in 1983 there were 19 presidents (the constitutional term was six years) and 38 
Ministers of the Economy.13 Between 1946 and 1983 only one President served a full 
term and there were 13 military golpes, on several occasions one faction of the armed 
forces intervening in Order to oust a general who had lost the confidence of his collea- 
gues or been installed by a different clique.
The collapse of democratic institutions is various dated as occurring in 1930 when, 
with widespread civilian support, the Army overthrew popularly elected President 
Hipölito Yrigoyen of the Uniön Cfvica Radical (1928-30) or in 1943 when the armed 
forces again intervened with substantial civil support to overturn the particularly corrupt 
administration of Vice-President Ramön Castillo (who had taken over from a terminally 
ill Roberto M. Ortfz [1938-1942]) or in 1955 when the second Perön administration was 
tumed out, the coup enjoying widespread middle d ass support. However, if military 
action in 1930, 1943 and 1955 attracted substantial or even massive civilian approval, 
thereafter interventions by the armed forces tended to be determined by an agenda 
framed almost exclusively in military and, to a much lesser degree, business circles. After 
1955 the only golpe to attract broad civilian support (or relief) was the overthrow of 
Isabel Perön in 1976.
What was the relationship between economic and political cycles? Did the decom­
position of political institutions prefigure economic collapse or did economic stasis 
reveal the fragility of political and social institutions, precipitating a descent into violen-
11 Statistical Abstract o f Latin America and The Americas and Australasia various issues.
12 Di'az Alejandro, Essays-, Di Telia and Zymelman, Las etapas. See also Di Telia and 
Dornbusch (eds.) The Political Economy o f Argentina and C.M. Lewis, ‘Cycles and Ma- 
croeconomic Policy since the 1930s’ in C.M. Lewis and N. Torrents (eds.) Argentina in the 
Crisis Years, 1983-1990 (London, 1993).
13 Di Telia and Dornbusch (eds.) Political Economy pp.xiii-xvi.
ce? Few would deny that the apparently ‘permanent’ crisis of political institutions after 
1955 (or 1930) influenced the level of economic activity. Students of Argentinian politi­
cal history offer a chronology that parallels phases of expansion, adjustment and in- 
stability demarcated by economic historians. The 1850s and 1860s witnessed the format­
ion of an Oligarchie state whose institutions proved remarkably durable from the 1870s 
to the 1910s. Were the years around the turn of the Century a period of reform, culmi- 
nating in new electoral arrangements (the Säenz Pena law of 1912) that ushered in an 
experiment in democracy between 1916 and 1930? Or was this period simply an exten­
sion of the Oligarchie republic despite the veneer of formally democratic politics? 
Nationalism, though not unchallenged, was the dominant current from the 1930s to the 
1970s and may have served for part of this period as a force for social cohesion or at 
least masked growing social antagonisms as first the middle classes and later the urban 
Proletariat clamoured for access to political power. The 1980s and 1990s marked a 
retreat from nationalism and a new search for durable political institutions.
Explaining economic involution
Why did the early promise of rapid economic growth at the tum of the Century not 
translate into sustained development? Historians have grappled with this question to 
little avail. In the process Argentinian economic historiography has become riven by 
dispute which has tended to demonise rather than inform. Too often the search for 
explanations has resulted in scape-goating - of individuals, groups, regimes and periods - 
and polemicised assertion instead of analysis. Partisan ideologues have sought to 
attribute blame rather than illuminate process and to vindicate favoured projects by 
reference to an idealised past wilfully destroyed or misguidedly jeopardised by political 
opponents. The literature is littered with ‘golden eras’, missed opportunities, watersheds 
and firmly espoused opinions that defy consensus.
Modem Argentinian institutions took shape after 1853. But was the arrangement 
encapsulated in the 1853 Constitution and the 1880 Settlement a model for national 
development or the particular project of a single group, namely the land-owning dass of 
the littoral provinces? Much of the controversy in the historiography, and arguments 
about the subsequent course of national history, stem from this question. Thus was bom 
a dichotomised view of state, society and economy. Did the events of 1852 (or 1879/80) 
liberate the country from a despotic past, substituting constitutionalism and social 
progress for a bucolic barbarism of anarchy and vice - the politics of contesting rural 
strongmen (caudillos) - and primitive accumulation? Or was a system of traditional 
values - Roman Catholicism, hierarchy (tempered by rugged individualism and a rude 
egalitarianism), and national independence - sacrificed on the altar of intemationalism 
in the quest for transient, inequitably distributed, economic gain?
One certainty is that rapid growth in the late nineteenth Century was predicated on 
linkage effects deriving from a favourable factor mix - seemingly inexhaustible stocks of 
fertile Iand complemented by imported supplies of capital and labour - and insertion 
into a dynamic international economy.14 Around the end of the nineteenth Century, 
public officials and proponents of liberal theoiy measured growth in terms of increasing 
population, an expansion in overseas trade, inflows of foreign finance, and rising 
govemment expenditure, not least on social overhead capital investment. This tradition 
has been continued by many historians.15 But could, or would, rapid export-propelled 
growth promote self-sustaining development as predicted by classical economic theory? 
A number of economic and social historians have questioned the inevitability of deve­
lopment. Domestic, structural and conjunctural factors have been identified as limiting 
the dynamics and the internal economic multiplier and social diffusion affects of export­
led expansion. Some authors are content to explain and describe the dimension of the 
Argentinian failure to sustain growth. Others offer both explanations and solutions.
Several currents may be identified in the economic and social historiography. A 
revisionist, historicist school challenges assertions about the strength and duration of the 
‘golden era’ of export-oriented growth encountered in the orthodox modernisation 
literature. A second school (originating in works published around the First World War) 
articulated what may be described as a nationalist critique and influenced a third 
approach, structuralism, popularised after the late 1940s. Fourth, dependency writing in 
the 1960s and 1970s also had an impact on the historiography and was critical of both 
the 1880 project, the economic and social processes that it engendered and developmen- 
talist solutions to the lost of dynamism sustained in the 1950s and 1960s. Fifth, radical 
neo-liberal explanations have recently become vogue, challenging Interventionist thinking 
and anti-intemationalism associated with some structuralist writing and crude dependen­
cy analyses. Authors of this school point to the high cost of economic isolation, even 
during the problematic 1930s. Sixth, neo-political economists have emphasised social 
factors responsible for changes in the economic policy regime and, therefore, implicitly 
for policy errors stressed by neo-liberals and ‘mismanagement’ targeted even earlier by
14 See R. Cortes Conde El progreso argentino, 1880-1914 (Buenos Aires, 1979); C.B. Sched- 
vin ‘Staples and Regions of Pax Britannica’, Economic History Review 43:4 (1990) 533-59: 
V. Väzquez-Presedo, El Caso argentino: migraciön de factores, comercio exterior y  desarro- 
llo, 1875-1914 (Buenos Aires, 1971).
15 See for example E. Tornquist, The Economic Development o f the Argentine Republic in the 
Last Fifty Years (Buenos Aires, 1919). Di'az Alejandro makes use of this material in his 
classic study, Essays, pp.2-3: between 1865/69 and 1910/14 railway mileage grew by an 
average of 15.4% per annum (compared to 1.4% per annum between 1910/14 and 
1925/29); population by 3.4% (2.8%); exports by 6.1% by value (3.9% by volume); imports 
by 5.4% by value (2.4% by volume); real GDP by at least 5% between the 1860’s and 
1910s.
structuralists and others. Finally, another body of literature which explores the inter­
national conjuncture of the middle thirdof the twentieth Century, held to have been par- 
ticularly disadvantageous for the republic, echoes some of the arguments advanced for 
earlier periods by other schools. This list is not comprehensive nor are the schools 
exclusive. Several attach differing degrees of importance to the same issue or series of 
events. An interesting feature of the literature is the extent to which Argentinian authors 
contributing to the academic debate since the 1930s have held political office or served 
in senior administrative capacities.16
Tülio Halperin Donghi and others have stressed the relative shortness of the 
period of really rapid growth, the socially fragmented and politically limited nature of 
late-nineteenth Century modernisation, the perpetuation of sharp regional dichotomies 
and negative aspects of foreign direct investment.17 A few illustrations will suffice. 
Exponents of the liberal development model may have emphasised the utility of immi­
gration from Europe, not least in terms of worker discipline and literacy, but for illitera- 
te campesirtos the flood of foreign immigrants and capital represented a threat rather 
than a force for liberation. The response was often violent protest.18 Gauchos and the 
descendants of ex-slaves, subjected to oppressive vagrancy laws, came to constitute a 
rural and urban underclass. On the fringe of the export economy, these groups were 
socially and politically marginalised until the 1940s.19 For other sectors, too, foreign 
investment and the growing presence of overseas corporations in the domestic market 
place was viewed as negative not positive. Crowding out and limited access to credit
16 For example, Raul Prebisch, Aldo Ferrer, Guido Di Telia and Domingo Cavallo.
17 T. Halperin Donghi, ‘The Argentine Export Economy: intimations of mortality, 1894-1930’ 
in G. Di Telia and D.C.M. Platt (eds.), The Political Economy of Argentina, 1880-1946 
(London, 1986); D. Rock, ‘Argentina in 1914’ in L. Bethell (ed.), The Cambridge History 
o f Latin America, Volume V: c. 1870-1930 (Cambridge, 1986); J.S. Tulchin ‘The Relation­
ship between Labour and Capital in Rural Argentina, 1880-1914’. in G. Di Telia and 
D.C.M. Platt (eds.), The Political Economy o f Argentina, 1880-1946 (London, 1986).
18 E. Gallo ‘Argentina: society and politics, 1880-1916’ in L. Bethell (ed.), The Cambridge 
History o f Latin America Vol. V, c. 1870 to 1930 (Cambridge, 1986), pp.370-1; C. Solberg, 
‘Farm-workers and the Myth of Export-led development in Argentina’, The Americas, 32:2 
(1974) 121-38.
19 R.W. Slatta, Gauchos and the Vanishing Frontier (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1983) pp.2-6; R. 
Salvatore, ‘Labor Control and Discrimination: The contratista system in Mendoza, Argenti­
na, 1880-1920’, Agricultural History 60: (1986); R.S. Shipley, ‘On the Outside Looking In: 
a social history of the porteno worker during the "Golden Age” of Argentine Develop­
ment, 1914-1930’, (unpublished PhD dissertation, Rutgers University 1977); Solberg, 
‘Farm-workers’. For liberal reformers of the period, the gaucho were anathema. They 
epitomised the backwardness of traditional Argentinian society and also constituted a 
political threat, having been mobilised by Rosas. See D.F. Sarmiento, Life in the Argentine 
Republic in the Days o f the Tyrants (New York, 1961), J. Lynch, Argentine Dictator: Juan 
Manuel de Rosas, 1829-1852 (Oxford, 1981) pp.38-9, 101-9, 189-92.
confronted would-be domestic entrepreneurs, particularly owners of small firms that 
proliferated in the depression and war years.20 This was a criticism of export-led growth 
that would feature prominently in nationalist and structuralists criticisms of the 1930s 
and 1940s. However, well before the end of the nineteenth Century, up-countiy provinci- 
al elites were well aware of the problem. Factions of the old federalist Opposition to 
centralism and dominance by Buenos Aires were less committed to export-led growth 
than their pampaen counterparts. Insertion in the world system was viewed by many 
provincial elites as a porteno project that afforded only transient benefits and threatened 
to disturb fragile local power relations.21
Around the turn of the Century, landowners in the pampa hümeda were able to 
move into high-grade cattle production for the lucrative overseas meat trades. Shifting 
from sheep to cattle and from live to frozen and, finally, to chilled meat exports, central 
pampaen producers embarked upon a Programme Of specialisation that fostered concen- 
tration in large units of production thereby curtailing the shift towards medium-scale 
enterprises associated with the wool cycle of the mid-nineteenth Century and later cereal 
cultivation in the agricultural colonies of Santa Fe, Entre Rfos and Cordoba.22 Did the 
refocus on cattle-raising in the pampas prevent the emergence of ‘model’ homestead 
farming? It has certainly been argued that a rent-seeking rural oligarchy frustrated the 
development of a dynamic pattem of medium-scale mixed farming.23 Was the profitabi- 
lity of pampaen pastoralists dependent on the use of political power to rig games rules 
in favour of the ranching sector?24 Alternately, it may be argued that the switch to
20 J. Teichman, ‘Intererst Conflicts and Entrepreneurial Support for Perön’ Latin American 
Research Review, 16:1 (1981) 144-55.
21 D. Rock, Authotitarian Argentine: the nationalist movement, its history and its impact 
(Berkeley, 1993) pp.51-2; Gorostegui de Torres, La organizaciön nacional-, F.J. McLynn, 
‘Political Instability in Cordoba Province during the 1860s’, Ibero-Amerikanisches Archiv 6:3 
(1980) pp.263-4. See also N. Botana, El orden conservador: la politica argentina entre 1880 
y 1916 (Buenos Aires, 1977).
22 E. Gallo, ‘Santa Fe en la segunda mitad del siglo xix: transformaciones en su estructura 
regional’ in T. Di Telia and T. Halperin Donghi (eds.) Los fragmentos del poder (Buenos 
Aires, 1969) and La pampa gringa: la colonizaciön agncola en Santa Fe, 1870-1895 
(Buenos Aires, 1984); H. Säbato, Agrarmn Capitalism and the World Market: Buenos Aires 
in the pastoral age, 1840-1890 (Albuquerque, 1990).
23 J.R. Scobie, Revolution on the Pampas: a social history o f Argentine wheat, 1860-1910 
(Austin, Texas, 1967), pp.31, 45-6, 50-1: C. Solberg, ‘Rural Unrest and Agrarian Policy in 
Argentina, 1912-1930’, Journal o f Inter-American Studies and World Ajfairs 13 (1971), and 
The Prairies and the Pampas: agrarian policy in Canada and Argentina, 1880-1930 (Stan­
ford, 1987).
24 J.F. Säbato Nota sobre la formaciön de la clase dominante en la Argentina modema, 1880­
1914 (Buenos Aires, mimeos/CISEA 1979) passim, especially pp.135-63; A. Pucciarelli, El 
capitalismo agrario pampeano, 1880-1930 (Buenos Aires, 1986) pp.55-68; Scobie, Revolu­
tion on the Pampas-, Solberg, The Prairies and the Pampas, pp.146-55: Rock, Argentina,
prime beef production reflected the entrepreneurial talent of the bonarense rural 
oligarchy and testified to the economic vitality of Argentinian latifundismo which, like 
the English tripartite system of large-scale landownership, tenancy and rural Proletariat, 
permitted flexible, efficient responses to market signals.25 Commodity diversification 
may also have extended to phase of dynamic export growth.
Irrespective of the constructions placed upon the cause or course of events, it is 
clear that several groups were excluded from the benefits of, or considered themselves 
to be marginalised by, the process of export-led growth and that the buoyancy of the 
sector was beginning to falter in the early decades of the twentieth Century. Marginalised 
sectors such as rural workers, up-country elites and those antagonised by economic and 
social challenges provoked by export-led growth provided a constituency that opponents 
of the ‘liberal project’ and economic intemationalism would subsequently find it easy to 
mobilise.26 As will be argued below, these groups formed the bases of political support 
for nationalist or Interventionist economic policies subsequently held responsible by neo- 
liberals for undermining Argentinian international competitiveness. If ‘closed’ policies of 
the third quarter of the twentieth Century account for economic Stagnation, institutional 
inefficiency - political ‘exclusion’ - around the tum of the Century contributed to the 
formation of the alliances that advanced those policies. Moreover, even if attempts to 
revise downward the duration of the phase of really rapid export growth are exaggera- 
ted, it is clear that ‘super export staple’ dynamism could not last indefinitely. Hence, it 
is equally clear that institutional flexibility was vital for continuing economic expansion 
and that societal factors after the turn of the Century tended to reduce rather than 
enhance institutional flexibility.
Archaic institutions checked economic transformation and proved to be remarkably 
resilient - or resistant - in the face of capitalist modemisation. According to Brown, 
pattems of land tenure both reflected a pre-modern social order and perpetuated a 
system of social discrimination that frustrated societal modemisation along dass lines. 
Hence the authoritarian liberalism of the Oligarchie republic resulted from incomplete 
social change and in turn under-wrote populist experiments of the middle third of the
1516-1982, pp.139-42.
25 Adelman, Frontier Development, pp.73-4, 76-7, 78-80, 96.
26 D. Rock, ‘The Survival and Restoration of Peronism’ in D. Rock (Ed.), Argentina in the 
Twentieth Century (London, 1975), pp.183-4 and Argentina, 1516-1982, pp.234-4; C.H. 
Waisman, Reversal o f Development in Argentina: postwar counterrevolutionary policies and 
their structural consequences (Princeton, 1987); P. Waldmann, El peronismo, 1943-1955 
(Buenos Aires, 1981), pp.22-3; Salvatore, ‘Labor Control’; F. Luna, Perön y su tiempo: la 
Argentina era una fiesta, 1946-69 (Buenos Aires, 1984), especially pp.41-140, 214-48. For 
a revisionist review of traditional arguments about worker co-option see W. Little, ‘The 
Populär Origins of Peronist’ in D. Rock (ed.), Argentina in the Twentieth Century, pp. 162­
78.
twentieth Century.27 Pre-capitalist institutional arrangements were sustained, rather than 
undermined, by rapid economic growth which fostered the politics of co-option and 
Containment. Subordinate groups, ‘dass fragments’, sectional interests and rival factions 
were manipulated - and played off one against another - by dominant sectors. Behind 
the facade of organisational reform, high politics was dominated by a relatively small 
group of elite families that absorbed aspiring immigrant talent. Hence personalism and 
authoritarianism were features common to the regime of Rosas, the apparently ‘merito- 
cratic’ politics of the pax rocista, periods of party competition in the twentieth Century 
and, not least, the peronato.a  Like Rosas, Perön was able to present himself to the 
establishment of the day as the alternative to chaos, in the latter case emphasising 
welfarism as the alternative to socialist revolution.29
A general slowdown in the rate of growth of exports was observed by contempo- 
raries after the turn of the Century. They were particularly concerned about the impact 
of external market volatility on domestic incomes and the overall efficiency of the export 
sector. While some were critical of mechanisms of the export economy, others were 
more confrontational, questioning the capacity of the system to deliver what would later 
be described as structural change. Arguably, the most coherent and consistent criticisms 
were articulated by conservative nationalists associated with the Revista de economia 
argentina, a journal that circulated amongst an academic, official and, perhaps, business 
readership.30 The most prolific member of this ‘school’ was Alejandro E. Bunge who 
moved from questioning the efficacy of the export-led model to refuting its utility as a 
vehicle for ‘national’ development. While others pressed for greater competition among 
(largely) foreign-owned utility Companies and a state-sponsored programme of infrastruc- 
tural modernisation to make Argentinian Commodities more competitive and less 
exposed to fluctuations in world markets, Bunge argued for tariff reform to foster 
‘natural’ industrialisation and the export of products with higher valued-added. Bunge 
and the nationalists advocated state action to develop physical resources for internal use. 
Many items on the Bunge agenda would later find expression in the 1940 project for
27 J.C. Brown, ‘The Bondage of Old Habits in Nineteenth-Century Argentina’, Latin Ameri­
can Research Review 21:2 (1986) 3-32.
28 D.M. Richmond, Carlos Pellegrini and the Crisis o f the Aigentine Elites, 1880-1916 (New 
York, 1989); Rock, Argentina, 1516-1983, pp.184-5; Waldmann, El Peronismo, 1943-55, 
pp.38-9, 41; N. Botana, El orden conservador: la polttica argentina entre 1880 y 1916 (Bue­
nos Aires, 1979) pp.50-60, 71-9, 152-202; D. Rock, Politics in Argentina, 1890-1930: the rise 
and fall o f Radicalism (Cambridge, 1975), pp.265-7.
29 Waisman, Reversal o f Development in Argentina, pp.212-29, especially p.226. See also 
Lynch, Argentine Dictator, pp.2-3, 123, 125, 157.
30 M. Falcoff, ‘Economic Dependency in a Conservative Mirror: Alejandro Bunge and the 
Argentine frustration 1919-1943’; Inter-American Economic Affairs 35:4 (1982) 57-75.
economic recovery, a package of measures that in tum influenced post-1946 Peronist 
strategies.31 Proponents of the R evistade economia argentina school envisaged also 
more pro-active social policies, notably in health and housing, to promote natural 
population growth (rather than Immigration), to instill discipline, and to pre-empt 
‘agitation’.32 There was a distinct Listian and Bismarckian tone to much of this dis- 
cussion.
Taken together, these views represented a comprehensive re-appraisal of the 
mechanisms and consequences of national development up to that point. Many of these 
criticisms were absorbed into subsequent scholarship. In addition, several of the ele­
ments of the debate amongst technocrats at this time - external vulnerability, macroeco- 
nomic efficiency and the need to promote manufacturing - would later be echoed in 
early publications of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). Arguably 
this is unsurprising as Raül Prebisch was then beginning his career as a civil servant and 
academic, initially engaged in editing the economic journal of the influential Banco de 
la Nacion Argentina before serving in more senior capacities at the bank, exchange 
control commission, the Central Bank and advisor to Federico Pinedo, sometime 
Minister of Finance who devised the 1940 economic recovery plan. Later, of course, 
Prebisch would become secretary general of ECLA. Another remarkable feature of the 
Contemporary Argentinian academic debate about economic policy options was its depth 
and breadth. By the 1910s, individual critics of what would later be called ‘export-led 
growth’ were to be encountered in a number of Latin American countries. The Argen-
31 J.J. Llach, ‘El Plan Pinedo de 1940, su significado histörico y los orfgenes de la economia 
polftica del peronismo’, Desarrollo Econömico 23:92 (1983/4).
32 See, in particular, AE. Bunge, Rujueza y renta de la Argentina: su distribuciön y su 
capacidad contributiva (Buenos Aires, 1917), Los problemas econömicos del presente: 
poblaciön, trabajo, costo de la vida, poder de la compra de la moneda, producciön e 
industrias nacionales (Buenos Aires, 1920) La economia argentina (1926-8), ‘Costo de vida 
en la Argentina de 1910 a 1917: nümeros indicadores’, Revista de economia argentina 1:1 
(1918). For other ‘Contemporary’ accounts, see also J.B. Gonzales, El encarecimiento de 
vida en la Repüblica Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1908), M.A Carcano, Evoluciön histörica
- del regimen de la tierra publica, 1810-1916 (Buenos Aires, 1916). For more recent dis- 
cussions, see N. Girbal de Blacha, Estado, chacareros y terratenientes, 1916-1930 (Buenos 
Aires, 1988), H. Säbato, ‘Trabajar para vivir o vivir para trabajar: empleo ocasional y 
escasez de mano de obra en Buenos Aires - ciudad y campana, 1850-1880’ in N. Sänchez 
Albomoz (ed.), Poblaciön y  mano de obra en America Latina (Madrid, 1985), J. Adelman, 
‘The Harvest Hand: wage-labouring on the pampas, 1890-1914’ in J. Adelman (Ed.), 
Essays in Argentine Labour History, 1870-1930 (London, 1992), C.M. Lewis, ‘Economic 
Restructuring and Labour Scarcity: labour in the 1920s’, in J. Adelman (ed.), Essays in 
Argentine Labour History, 1870-1930 (London, 1992) and ‘Social Insurance: ideology and 
policy in the Argentine, c. 1920-1966’ in C. Abel and C.M. Lewis (eds.), Latin America: 
welfare, poverty and development (London, 1983).
tine was exceptional in that ‘schools’ of thought were emerging, some of them within the 
regime. Ideas advanced by these schools were sustained over time and offered, in 
addition, alternative strategies to those then in vogue 33
Paradoxically, critics of liberal orthodoxy have also been assisted by variants arising 
within conventional modemisation theory. A controversial study by Guido Di Telia and 
Manuel Zymelman argues that the gear change from growth to development was far 
from automatic. Extending stage-theory elaborated by Rostow, they add an extra phase, 
the ‘great delay’ (la gran demorä) when the country failed to accomplish the predicted 
transition from ‘take-off to ‘self-sustaining growth’.34 Accepting this reservation, and 
opinions advanced in the Revista de economta argentina, structuralists refer to a broader 
mix of flaws and misconceptions in the liberal project. Employing the concepts of centre- 
periphery and drawing on the debate about secular movements in the terms of trade 
against primary exporting economies formulated by the Economic Commission for Latin 
America, the most complete structuralist critique of Argentinian export-led growth has 
been presented by Aldo Ferrer.35 For Ferrer, export price instability and sluggish 
growth in the twentieth Century were due to a combination of internal and external 
factors. With the closing of the frontier in the 1920s, the extensive system of production 
that had prevailed up to that point - dependent on imports of labour and Capital to 
exploit newly incorporated land - was doomed. The precarious nature of extensive 
patterns of growth exposed past failures to resolve problems of efficiency (associated 
with the configuration of infrastructural investment, patterns of land tenure and misgui- 
ded official policy that resulted in regional, sectoral and social imbalance). IU-considered 
strategies of ‘hot-house’ industrialisation undertaken during the 1940s compounded 
economic disarticulation, a problem that was intensifies by systemic changes in the 
global economic environment. The displacement of Britain, still a relatively open market 
for River Plate exports, by the USA as the major world trading and investing economy, 
coupled with an inexorable deterioration in the terms of trade, provoked a cycle of 
balance of payments crises and inflation that frustrated programmes of adjustment,
33 Rock, Authoritarian Argentina pp.120-2.127-8. For other countries see, A  Encina, Nuestra 
inferioridad econömica (Santiago de Chile, 1912) and A  Molina Enriquez, Los grandes 
problemas nationales (Mexico, 1909).
34 G. Di Telia and M. Zymelman, Las etapas del desarrollo econömico argentino (Buenos 
Aires, 1967), passim., especially pp.22-32, 71-103 and ‘El desarrollo de los espacios 
abiertos’, El Trimestre Econömico 30:116 (1962).
35 A  Ferrer, The Argentine Economy (berkeley, 1967) and Desarrollo sin dependencia (Bue­
nos Aires 1974). Ferrer’s ideas were first elaborated in the article ‘Los problemas de la 
transiciön: el caso argentino’, El Trimestre Econömico, 30:117 (1963) pp.1-14. See also 
United Nations Organization, Economic Commission for Latin America, ‘Economic 
Development of Argentina’ in Economic Development o f Latin America, 1949 (New York, 
1951) pp.89-195 and El desarrollo econömico argentino Vol. I (Mexico, 1959).
triggering an enduring struggle between investment and consumption that in tum 
fostered political instability for several generations. In the ensuring violence, domestic 
institutions proved incapable of resolving distributional conflicts without recourse to 
coercion. The solution to this conundrum, argued Ferrer, lay in comprehensive, state- 
direct industrial expansion and grater export efficiency. Some of these programmes were 
not so distant from suggestions offered earlier by conservative nationalists.
Radical critics of both the liberal project and structuralist solutions - import- 
substituting industrialisation - were indebted to nationalist and structuralist diagnoses. 
Proponents of various strands of dependency theory highlighted the social and economic 
distortions resulting from insertion within the world economy. Export-led growth had 
benefitted a narrow spectrum of society precisely because the model was sectionally 
conceived by a land-owning oligarchy and its foreign commercial and financial allies. 
Citing both nationalist attacks of the 1930s on contemporaiy bilateral relations with 
Britain (and the pernicious influence of Britain on internal politics and economics in the 
nineteenth Century36) and the supposed positive impact of the First World War and 
inter-war depression on domestic industrial output, dependistas preached social revo­
lution and asserted that autonomous, national development could only result from ‘de- 
linkage’, the Separation of the Argentine from the international economy.37
Dependistas accepted the constructions placed by cepalistas on relative international 
price movements and their analysis of the inequality of exchange between ‘peripheral’ 
primary producing economies and the industrialised ‘centre’ but rejected structuralist 
strategies as mere palliatives. Programmes of Intervention and forced-industrialisation 
had not resulted in an efficiently regulated ‘semi-closed’ economy but induced adminis­
trative and productive inefficiency, the result of oligopolist or monopolistic behaviour by 
p'owerful, anti-progressive blocs able to command the state. During the period of 
govemment-directed, skewed development, income inequalities worsened and trans­
national corporations penetrated the manufacturing sector, deepening Argentinian 
dependence. These criticisms triggered debate, had an affect on the political discourse 
and even inspired direct action by disaffected groups, but did not have a policy impact 
comparable to cepalista developmentalism.38 In the 1970s the dependency critique
36 See, for example, R. Scalabrini Orti'z, Politica britänica en el Rio de la Plata (Buenos 
Aires, 1940) or R. and J. Irazusta, La Argentina y  el imperialismo britänico: los eslabones 
de una cadena, 1806-1933 (Buenos Aires, 1934). For an alternative assessment, particularly 
of the events on the 1930s, see P. Alhadeff, ‘Dependency, Historiography and Objections 
to the Roca Pact’ in C. Abel and C.M. Lewis (eds.), Latin America: economic imperialism 
and the state (London, 1991).
37 J.E. Corradi, The Fitful Republic (London, 1985). For more polemical texts, J. Fuchs, 
Argentina: su desarrollo capitalista (Buenos Aires, 1965).
38 G. O’Donnell, El estado burocrätico-autoritario (Buenos Aires, 1981), especially chapter 5; 
R. Gillespie, Soldiers o f Perön: Argentina ’s montoneros (Oxford, 1982).
became increasingly sterile. It provided a telling comment on post-Second World War 
uneven development but failed to recognise the evolutionary potential of structuralist 
prescriptions and the pace of change in the global economy.39
Recent years have seen a re-vindication of liberal - or neo-liberal - orthodoxy. This 
has been driven by comparative historical analysis as much as by the severity of the 
Argentinian predicament. By the 1970s, issues such as economic stasis, a crisis of regime 
legitimacy and proximate institutional collapse were being widely debated by Argentini- 
ans who were becoming increasingly aware that the performance of the economy since 
the Second World War compared unfavourably with the historic record, with the 
Contemporary experience of other large Latin American economies and with traditional 
reference point such as Italy and Spain or Australia and Canada.40 As Table I indi- 
cates, notwithstanding the different periodisation adopted by Cortes Conde and 
Maddison, in comparative terms the loss of economic momentum was greatest in two 
periods: the years around the World Wars and c. mid-1970/mid-1980s. Neo-diffusionists, 
in particular, pointed to social and economic costs associated with inward-looking 
strategies applied from the 1940s to the 1970s that arose from a corruption of market 
signals. Some authors also devote cönsiderable attention to organisational factors and 
technical issues such as demographic dependence. These new interpretations of Argenti­
nian economic history draw on the statistical techniques of applied economics and the 
microeconomic approach of the new political economy in addition to classical economic
39 For a provocative ‘traditional’ marxist criticism of dependency, see B. Warren, Imperialism: 
pioneer of capitalism (London, 1980). Warren’s original Statement appeared as ‘Imperialism 
and Capitalist Industrialisation’, New Left Review 81 (1973). See also the reply by A  
Emmanuel NLR LXXXV (1974). For revisionist accounts of the achievements of structu­
ralist development strategy, see E. Ablin and J. Katz, ‘From Infant Industry to Technology 
Exports: the Argentine experience on the sale of industrial plants and engineering work’ 
in J. Katz (ed.), Technology Generation in Latin American Manufacturing Industries 
(London, 1987); L.R. Alschuler, ‘Argentina: from egalitarian Stagnation to authoritarian 
growth’ in L.E. Alschuler (ed.), Multinationals and Maldevelopment (London, 1987); M. 
Rodriguez, B. Kosakoff (eds.), El desfio de la competUividad: la industria argentina en 
transformaciön (Buenos Aires, 1993).
40 See, for example, D. Diaz Fuentes, Las pollticas fiscales latinoamericanas frente a la gran 
depresiön: Argentina, Brasil y Mixko, 1920-1940 (Madrid, 1993) and Crisis y cambios 
estructurales en America Latina: Argentina, Brasil y Mexico durante el periodo de entre- 
guerras (Mexico, 1994); T. Duncan and J. Fogarty, Australia and Argentina: on parallel 
paths, (Melbourne, 1986); J. Fogarty, E. Gallo and H. Dieguez (eds.), Argentina y Australia 
(Buenos Aires, 1979); D.C.M. Platt and G. Di Telia (eds.), Argentine, Canada and Austra­
lia: studies in comparative development, 1870-1965 (London, 1985); D.C.M. Platt (ed.), 
Social Welfare, 1850-1950: Australia, Argentina and Canada compared (London, 1989); I. 
Ortfz Donat, ’Economic Transitions: state and industry in Argentina and Spain, 1975­
1990’, unpublished University of London PhD thesis, 1993.
theory in order to analyze the national growth record and make comparisons with other 
economies.41 .
Neo-liberal theorists admit that the international system became increasingly 
unstable during the second quarter of the twentieth Century and that this posed particu- 
lar problems for the republic. Nevertheless, using the actual growth trajectory of Canada 
and Australia as a proxy, one recent analysis has calculated that the Argentinian econo­
my would have been at least 50 percent ‘larger’ (and possibly more than twice as large) 
in the early 1980s had less isolationist and less Interventionist policies been applied since 
the 1920s.42 While many neo-liberals account for poor post-Second World War per­
formance in terms of misconceived strategies and policy errors, some neo-diffusionists 
caution against glib comparisons with other areas of recent settlement. Taylor, for 
example, acknowledges that protectionism increased the cost of capital imports, thereby 
reducing the efficiency of savings, and that prioritising consumption over investment 
during the early Perön years further reduced the stock of investment resources. Never­
theless, echoing Halperfn, Taylor also maintains that relative decline pre-dated the 
application of overtly statist policies.43 Compared with the main industrialised econo­
mies and other areas of recent settlement, Argentinian rates of growth began to falter 
in the 1920s. Post-war policy mistakes simply widened the gap. For Taylor, high rates of 
pre-First World War immigration explain lower per capita levels of output compared 
with other areas of recent settlement before that point and higher rates of demographic 
dependence thereafter. The demographic burden constrained savings, inhibited capital 
market deepening and generally frustrated domestic capital formation at a critical 
moment of limited international liquidity in the middle decades of the twentieth Cen­
tury.44 In contrast, Canada and Australia enjoyed even more favourable man/land 
ratios and smaller populations (and much lower rates of immigration). These factors 
made for substantially higher levels of GDP per capita at the beginning of the Century. 
The income and savings gap between the Argentine, on the one hand, and Canada and 
Australia, on the other, widened as immigration surged and Argentinian rates of demo­
graphic dependence rose (due to natural increase and net immigration). Extending
41 Most of the new political economists writing on the Argentine acknowledge a debt do 
D.C. North, especially Structure and Change in Economic History (New York, 1981) and 
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge, 1990), and E.L. 
Jones, Growth Recurring: economic change in world history (Oxford, 1988).
42 Y. Mundlak, D. Cavallo and R. Domenech, Agriculture and Economic Growth in Argentina, 
1913-84 (New York, 1989), passim, especially pp.116-7,119.
43 AM. Taylor, ‘Three Phases of Argentine Economic Growth’, National Bureau of Econo­
mic Research, Working Paper Series on Historical Factors in Long Run Growth N° 60 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1994).
44 AM. Taylor, ‘External Dependence, Demographic Burdens and Argentine Economic 
Decline after the "Belle Epoque"’, Journal of Economic History 52:4 (1992) 916-17, 920-2.
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Taylor, similar arguments can be made about welfarism later in the twentieth Century. 
Massive welfare expenditure reduced the ‘efficiency’ of investment when Capital was 
scarce or induced further rigidity at a time when labour markets were already tightening. 
Debates about the rate and efficiency of domestic savings and imperfections in the 
labour market are as applicable in the 1980s and the 1990s as in earlier periods.45
Schedvin maintains that location and the nature of export staples (commodity mix 
and production characteristics) only partly account for decline. Domestic institutional 
structures were, arguably, more important and explain why the Argentine was even less 
successful than Australia and New Zealand in escaping from the ‘staple trap’. As staples 
were exposed to diminishing returns, resource flexibility was essential to ensure structu- 
ral diversification around the original commodity base in order to cater for changing 
patterns of domestic and global demand.46 Imperfectly defined property rights - espe- 
cially rural property rights, in the first instance, and later uncertainty about interaction 
between the public and the private domains - limited the social diffusion effects of 
export production and, along with increasing political instability which resulted in 
frequent changes in the ‘rules of the game’, fostered rent-seeking.47
Economistic analyses, like those of Schedvin and Taylor, that acknowledge the 
importance of political economy and institutions implicitly echo Brown. Their work 
supports socio-political interpretations deriving from the premise that capitalist growth 
failed to change the basic organisational principles of Argentinian society. This view is 
obliquely acknowledged in recent interpretations in the political history. Populism, co- 
option, distributionism and authoritarianism are the terms that dominate the modern 
political Science literature.48 Indeed, ideology and structure were conspicuous by their 
absence in Argentinian electoral politics of the twentieth Century which has been 
dominated by ‘leaders’ and ‘movements’. In this climate, authoritarianism and the poli­
tics of co-option and exclusion flourished. The success - and survival - of the system 
depended on growth. The limits of this socio-political arrangement were revealed in the
45 Lewis ‘Cycles and Macroeconomic Policy’ pp.116-7 and ‘Social Insurance’ pp.178-9, 194-5.
46 Schedvin, ‘Staples and Regions’, pp.534, 534. See also, J. Fogarty, ‘Staples, Super-staples 
and the Limits of Staple Theory’, in D.C.M. Platt and G. Di Telia (eds.), Argentina, 
Australia and Canada: studies in comparative development (London, 1985).
47 Adelman, Frontier Development, pp.67-8; R. Saütu, ‘The role of the Private Sector in the 
Industrialisationof Argentina’, in Lewis and Torrents (eds.), Argentine in the Crisis Years 
pp.159-75.
48 G. O’Donnell, Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Argentina, 1966-1973, in comparative pers­
pective (Berkeley, 1988) and ‘Estado y alianzas en Argentina, 1956-76’, Desarrollo Econö- 
mico, 16:64 (1977). For a wider discussion of populism, particularly a definition, see M.L. 
Conniff (ed.), Latin American Populism in Comparative Perspective (1982 pp. 13-20, AE. 
van Niekerk, Populism and Political Development in Latin America (New York, 1974) 
pp.22-31.
middle decades of the twentieth Century. New groups (first the urban middle classes and 
later urban labour) clamoured for access to the system at precisely the moment when 
rates of growth began to falter. Consequently, economics and politics became a zero-sum 
game, perpetuating conflict in place of compromise. The system had proved incapable 
of establishing institutions able to resolve distributional crises when the domestic and 
international conjuncture were favourable. Hence systemic weakness was exacerbated by 
the politics of the new post-Second World War order.49 Populist arrangements - loose, 
multi-class, largely urban alliances headed by a  charismatic leader, devoid of ideological 
consistency or ‘ideological project’ - provided a facade of innovatory politics that tempo- 
rarily masked deep-rooted structural fissures in the body politic.
Domestic institutional short-comings were certainly highlighted by a deteriorating 
external environment. Hitherto closely linked with Britain, the republic was compromi- 
sed by economic decline and loss of international political prestige by the United 
Kingdom. If rapid growth and an economic orientation towards Europe in the pre-1930s 
period had fostered Claims to leadership in South America and encouraged the formu- 
lation of a foreign policy that was independent of, or antagonistic towards, the USA, 
such a Programme could only be sustained thereafter at great cost. Not least in terms of 
enabling the country to find in the USA an alternative ‘sponsor’ in place of the now 
decadent ‘patron’, the United Kingdom.50 Most students of international economic 
relations accept that a high price was exacted by the USA for Argentinian neutrality 
during the Second World War and that Washington was opposed to attempts by Perön 
to construct a ‘third path’ that was neither capitalist nor communist in the post-war 
years.51 On the eve of the Second World War, the country appeared to be locked into
49 G. W. Merkx, ‘Sectoral clashes and political change: the Argentine experience’, Latin 
American Research Review 4:3 (1969) 89-116 and ‘Recessions and Rebellions in Argentina, 
1870-1970’, Hispanic American Historical Review, 53:2 (1973); Rock, Politics in Argentina, 
pp.265-7; A  Canitrot, ‘La experiencia populista de redistribuciön de ingreso’, Desarrollo 
Econömico 16:59 (1975); P.H. Smith, Argentina and the Failure of Democracy: conflicts 
amongst political elites, 1904-1955 (Madison, 1974); M. Peralta Ramos, Acumulaciön de 
capital y crisis polüica en Argentina, 1930-74 (Buenos Aires, 1979); R.D. Mallon and J.V. 
Sourroville, Economic Policymaking in a Conflict Society: the Argentine case (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1975); G.W. Wynia. Argentina in the Post-War Era: politics and economic policy- 
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a commercial and financial relationship with Britain which intensified during the war, 
much to the annoyance of US business. Blocked sterling balances arising from war-time 
supplies to the Allies held at the Bank of England appeared to promise preferential 
access by British exporters to the Argentinian market after the conflict. Yet the country 
gained little goodwill with the USA for part-financing the Allied war effort. On the 
contrary, Buenos Aires’ insistence on neutrality and maintaining links with the Axis 
powers aroused the ire of the State Department which was inclined to depiet the 1943­
46 military regime and Perön as pro-fascist. Paradoxically, with the on-set of the Cold 
War, the Perön administration was viewed as likely to facilitate communist penetration 
of the continent. The result was a US trade embargo and an attempt to rig international 
markets against Argentinian exports. It is more debatable whether the US economic 
boycott at this point did more than intensify a process of structural and institutional 
ossification that was already well advanced.
Conclusion
The historiography continues to offer a greater consensus about the origins of 
growth in the nineteenth Century than the causes of Stagnation and emerging crisis in the 
twentieth. Nevertheless, the current attention devoted to political economy points to the 
centrality of institutional failure as an explanation for decline. Imperfect institutional 
modemisation may be explained by the mechanics of incorporation in the international 
economy, the functioning of the global system, and the apparent flexibility of existing 
domestic political arrangements which accommodated challenge without fundamental 
change. The extemal environment undoubtedly had an impact on the performance of 
the Argentinian economy, irrespective of how that environment is presented. Namely, 
whether in terms of the extended association with Britain during the second quarter of 
the twentieth Century when the British economy was faltering, the US boycott of the 
1940s, the unequal exchange debate popularised by the Economic Commission for Latin 
America or the less optimistic gloss place upon the golden era of export-led growth by 
Halperfn and others. Nevertheless, as the global environment was not so dissimilar for 
other countries which managed to sustain growth and effect a shift from growth to 
development, the key explanation must lie with domestic institutions.
(London, 1989); M. Rapaport, Gran Bretaha, Estados Unidos y las clases dirigentes 
argentinas, 1940-1945 (Buenos Aires, 1980); J.S. Tulchin, Argentina and the United States: 
a conflicted relationship (Boston, 1990). See also, A  O’Connell and J. Fodor, ‘La Argenti­
na y la economi'a atläntica en la primera mitad del siglo veinte’, Desarrollo Econömico, 
13:49 (1973) 1-67 and contributions in G. Di Telia and D.C.M. Platt (eds.), The Political 
Economy o f Argentina, 1880-1946 (London, 1986).
An inter-play of factors and processes can be suggested. By the second quarter of 
the twentieth Century, frontier exhaustion and increasing volatility in overseas markets 
signalled the end of the extensive growth project. A new model of accumulation was 
required in order to enhance domestic savings capacity and sustain the transition to a 
more capital intensive pattem of development. At precisely this point consumptions 
demands mushroomed as the political system was confronted by new groups striving for 
access. Unfortunately, the incomplete transformation of Argentinian society during the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth limited capacity for an efficient resolution of dis- 
tributional conflict. This resulted in a loss of legitimacy and conditions in which games 
rules were either imperfectly applied or repeatedly revised, an arrangement that fostered 
rent-seeking rather than profit maximisation and, ultimately, a zero-sum game in which 
powerful sections (business, labour, and the state itself) were unable to impose their own 
project but sufficiently powerful to subvert counter proposals. Institutional fragility or 
rigidity limited the capacity to respond efficiently to a shifting global and internal 
environment. Arguably, the combination of pressures - extemal vulnerability, challenges 
to an established domestic order and the economics of adjusting from one pattem of 
accumulation to another - would have taxed even the most robust system. Certainly, it 
proved a lethal combination for the Argentine.
Dr. Colin Lewis, geb. 1944, von The London School of Economics and Political 
Science, war im SS 1995 Gastprofessur am Institut für Spanien- und Lateinamerika­
studien (ISLA) der Universität Augsburg. Wichtige Publikationen: The New Ins- 
titutional Economics and Third World Development, London, 1995; Argentina in 
Transition (hrsg. zusammen mit Nissa Torrents), London 1993; Development, 
Nationalism and Dependence: the British Business Community in the Argentine 
since 1870, Routledge 1993; ’lndustry Before 1930: A Bibliography’ in: L. Bethell 
(Hg.): The Cambridge History of Latin America, Bd. 10; Historia empresarial bra- 
silena, c. 1850-1945: tendencias recientes en la literatura’, in; C. Dävila (Hg.): 
Historia empresarial latinoamericana, Bogotä 1993.
MESA REDONDA
Erschienene Hefte / Cuadernos publicados:
1. LOPEZ-CASERO, Francisco
La agrociudad mediterranes en una comparaciön intercultural. Enfoque para un proyecto 
de investigaciön (1985)
2. BERNECKER, Walther L.
Foreign Interests, Tariff Policy and Early Industrialization in Mexico 1821-1848 (1985)
3. SCHEERER, Thomas M.
La sangre y el papel - Eine Vorstudie zur Lyrik des Argentiniers Juan German (Juli 1985)
4. SOCOLOW, Susan Migden
Acceptable Partners: Marriage Choice in Colonial Argentina 1778-1810 (1987)
5. OSTERMANN, Heinz-Jürgen
Soziale Konsequenzen anhaltend hoher Inflation in Argentinien, Bolivien und Brasilien 
(September 1987)
6. LÖPEZ-CASERO, Francisco
Desarrollo de la burguesia en Colombia. El caso antioqueno y su aportaciön al sistema 
nacional (Januar 1988)
7. REIMANN, Helga L.
Gesellschaftliche Entwicklung und Frauenarbeit in Puerto Rico (März 1988)
8. KASSAI, Soledad Lagos de
El teatro chileno de creaciön colectiva - Testimonios desde Santiago 1988 (Dezember 
1988)
9. KASSAI, Laszlö B.
Wirtschaftliche Stellung deutscher Industrieunternehmen in Chile. Ergebnisse einer 
empirischen Analyse (Januar 1989)
10. ENSIGNIA L., Jaime
El camino a la transiciön democrätica. Chile 1989: Las elecciones presidenciales y parla- 
mentarias (September 1989)
11. DE TORO, Alfonso
Hacia un modelo para el teatro postmodemo (März 1990)
12. GALEANO, Eduardo
Notizen über die Erinnerung und das Feuer (Juli 1991)
13. ENSIGNIA L., Jaime
Chile - Sindicalismo en la transiciön (Juli 1991)
14. OSTERMANN, Roland
Sozialer Wandel in Spanien 1975-1992. Die sozialen Kosten des Wandels: Marginalisie- 
rung - Armut - Devianz (November 1992)
15. KOPP, Torsten
Im Teufelskreis von Marktmacht, physiokratischem Wirtschaftsstil und Wirtschaftsstagna­
tion. Die sozioökonomischen Probleme des "desarrollo endögeno" in der niederandalusi- 
schen Agrostadt Ecija (März 1993)
INF GINER, Salvador
La Modemizaciön de la Europa Meridional. Una Interpretation Sociolögica (März 1995)
2NF HOFFMANN, Karl-Dieter
Ökonomischer Fortschritt und soziale Marginalisierung: Die historische Genese des 
brasilianischen Wachstums- und Entwicklungsmodells. Eine Skizze (November 1995)
3NF KOHUT, Karl/MERTTNS, Günter
Cuba en 1995. Un diälogo entre investigadores alemanes y cubanos (November 1995)
4NF LEWIS, Colin M.
The Argentine: from economic growth to economic retardation (1850s - 1980s). A review 
of the economic and social history literature




